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The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three 
fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional 
investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary 
ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S. 
institutional investors now hold 20% and vote 25% of the shares in S&P 500 
companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which process has been 
driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these 
transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors 
have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are large institutions pressing for 
increased ESG disclosures?  
This article will offer two reasons for the desire of institutions for greater ESG 
disclosures: (1) ESG disclosures overlap substantially with systematic risk, which is 
the primary concern of diversified investors; and (2) high common ownership enables 
institutions to take collective action to curb externalities caused by portfolio firms, so 
long as the gains to their portfolio from such action exceed the losses caused to the 
externality-creating firms. This transition to a portfolio-wide perspective (both in 
voting and investment decisions) has significant implications but also is likely to 
provoke political controversy. As institutions shift to portfolio-wide decision making, 
the disclosure needs of individual investors and institutional investors diverge and 
serious conflicts can arise.  
 
Keywords and JEL Codes: Black/Scholes Option Pricing Model, Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), Common Ownership, Disclosure, ERISA, Externalities, Index 
Fund, Institutional Investor, SEC Sole Benefit Rule. G30, G32, G34, G38 and H23. 
 




THE FUTURE OF DISCLOSURE:  
ESG, COMMON OWNERSHIP, AND SYSTEMATIC RISK 
 
By John C. Coffee, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
How should disclosure policy change at the SEC in light of new market 
conditions and an evolving market structure? So framed, this is a fairly narrow 
question, which assumes that one accepts the need for a mandatory disclosure 
system.1 Once over that first hurdle, a second question logically follows: Do all 
investors have the same informational needs? Or do some have special needs? This 
article will suggest that individual and institutional investors have different needs 
(largely based on their level of diversification), and sharp conflicts can arise between 
them, particularly as institutional investors come to make voting and investment 
decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (instead of on a stock by stock basis).  
One cannot assess this topic without recognizing that we have moved far away 
from the environment in which the SEC grew up. In fact, three distinct and important 
transitions are in progress, but each is at a very different stage: 
First and most obvious, the “institutionalization” of the market has now been 
fully realized. Historically, the SEC has always seen its interests as closely aligned 
                                                            
 Professor Coffee is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School and Director of its 
Center on Corporate Governance.  
1Because this topic has been debated at length elsewhere, it will be sidestepped here. For defenses of a mandatory 
disclosure system, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 
70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984) (finding such a system is a cost-effective subsidy and produces positive externalities); 
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Disclosure is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. 
Rev. 1335 (1999). 
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with those of the retail investor.2 It has proclaimed itself “the investors’ advocate,”3 
and public investors have in turn recognized and applauded the SEC’s efforts. This 
mutual alliance gave the SEC relative political immunity that assured it reasonable 
budgetary appropriations, despite major swings in policy and times of great stress for 
other agencies over recent decades.4  
But that is past. The era in which retail investors “owned” companies or moved 
the trading markets is long gone and “deader than disco”. Today, retail investors 
account for only a modest minority of the ownership of large, publicly traded 
companies and probably less than 2% of the trading in NYSE-listed companies.5 Stock 
ownership is now dominated by institutional investors, who are increasingly 
diversified and often indexed.6  
The second transition involves the more recent and extraordinary 
concentration in stock ownership, with the result that as few as five to ten institutions 
                                                            
2 For this conclusion, see Joel Seligman, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A History of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (3d ed. 2003). 
3 Professor Donald Langevoort opens an excellent article dealing with the transition from a retail to an institutional 
market (and its implications for the SEC) by observing correctly in his first sentence: “The Securities and Exchange 
Commission thinks of itself as the investors’ advocate,…” Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, And 
The Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 at 1025 (2009). This phrase also appears 
regularly on the SEC’s website. 
4 I do not mean that the SEC always got what it wanted (or needed), but in comparison to other “consumer protection” 
agencies, including the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the more recent Consumer Financial 
Protection  Bureau, it has done relatively well. I attribute this not to uniformly brilliant leadership at the SEC, but to 
the fact that Congressmen know the SEC is popular with individual investors (and voters) in their jurisdiction. Here, 
it is also noteworthy that institutional investors do not vote. 
5 The level of institutional ownership can be measured in various ways but for some time institutions have owned over 
73% of the market value of outstanding equity securities in the U.S. Compare Sec. Industry & Fin. Mkt. Ass’n 
(“SIFMA”), 2007 Fact Book 65 (Charles M. Bartett, Jr. ed.) (73.4% institutional ownership) with #. For the 2% figure 
for trading by individuals, see Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1105 at 1105 
(2009). 
6 “Indexing,” or “indexed investing” refers to a passive investment strategy under which the investor invests in a broad 
market index (such as, for example, the S&P index), seeking not to outperform the market, but only to match it. As 
later discussed, much empirical research strongly suggests that retail investors cannot outperform the market and lose 
money when they attempt to do so. Indexed investing also reduces trading costs, as it is a “buy and hold” policy, and 
it can minimize tax liabilities.  
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today may be in a position to exercise de facto control over even a large public 
corporation. The Big Three of institutional investors -- BlackRock, Inc., State Street 
Global Investors, and the Vanguard Group -- now hold over 20% of the shares in S&P 
500 companies (and vote approximately 25%).7 Potentially, this might suggest that 
retail investors are exposed to domination by institutional control groups, but such a 
thesis would be overbroad. At first glance, little conflict is apparent between 
diversified institutions and retail investors, but, as will be discussed later, a potential 
conflict is developing as institutional investors, recognizing the power of their 
common ownership, are beginning to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (rather 
than seeking only to maximize each individual firm’s value). 
Meanwhile, retail investors have moved their investments from stock-picking 
mutual funds to index funds.8 Collectively, retail investors seem to have finally 
                                                            
7 This difference between 20 and 25% reflects the fact that many shares are not voted. For these percentages and for 
their prediction that the holdings of the Big Three will rise eventually to 40% or more, see Lucian Bebchuk and Scott 
Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721 (2019). To give an example of activism in action, just six 
shareholders control 24% of ExxonMobil, and the same six control 26% of Chevron, and they have pressured both 
companies regarding emissions and climate change. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (2020). These six included the foregoing Big Three and Northern Trust, Bank of America, and 
Capital Research Global Investors. Id. at 10 n.38. The stock  in publicly held companies (in terms of asset values) that 
is held by the ten largest mutual funds (not all of which are index funds) rose from 44% in 2000 to 56% in 2015, and 
the corresponding percentages held by the five largest such funds grew from 32% in 2000 to 45% in 2015. See The 
Investment Company Institute, 2016 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK at 14 and 17 (56th ed. 2016). 
Much of this literature about the growing concentration in the hands of a limited number of institutional 
owners has focused on the danger that such concentration will be anticompetitive, leading to shareholder pressure in 
some industries for firms not to compete. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harvard L. Rev. 1267 
(2016); Jose Azar, Martin Schmalz and Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. Fin. 1513 
(2018). However, the flip side of this coin is that institutions can use their collective power to induce their portfolio 
companies to behave in a more socially responsible manner (at least when it will benefit their portfolio on a net basis). 
In particular, concentrated owners can balance the gains caused to some companies in their portfolio by shareholder 
activism that restricts or discourages externalities that injure them against the losses experienced by the externality-
causing firms in the same portfolio. Although it cannot be assumed that the potential gains will necessarily exceed the 
potential losses, when they do, it is good business to force the internalization of the externalities by the firms causing 
them. See Condon, supra, at 10-11. 
8 In 2019, index funds (i.e., mutual funds that track a broad market index) for the first time exceeded traditional stock 
picking funds, holding $4.27 trillion in assets as compared to $4.25 trillion for traditional stock picking funds. See 
Dawn Lin, “Index Funds Are The New Kings Of Wall Street,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 18, 2019; see also Jill 
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recognized that they are poor stock pickers who systematically lose money when they 
trade actively on their own.9 As a result, they have migrated in large numbers to 
invest in highly diversified institutional intermediaries (led by the Big Three), 
thereby further increasing ownership concentration.10  
Finally, the third important transition involves a new demand among 
investors (particularly among large institutional investors) for a new category of 
information, known as “ESG” disclosures (ESG is an acronym that stands for 
“environmental, social, and governance”).11 ESG investing broadly relies on 
governance factors at the firm, as well as the environmental and social impact of the 
firm and its products on society.12  Although it is clear why social activists want to 
encourage such socially relevant disclosures, it puzzles many why diversified 
institutional investors appear to be the strongest proponents of increased ESG 
                                                            
Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for 
Passive Investors, 168 U.Pa. L. Rev. 17 (2019). 
9 The simple truth is that only a small minority of actively managed funds have outperformed passive index funds. In 
his Presidential Address to the American Economics Association, Professor Kenneth R. French assembled data 
showing that, over the period from 1980 to 2006, a passive investor would have on average beaten an actively trading 
investor by over sixty-seven basis points per year. See Kenneth French, Presidential Address, The Cost of Active 
Investing, 63 J. Fin 1537, 1561 (2008). 
10 While the Big Three now hold over 20%, some estimate that they will hold 40% or more of the shares in the S&P 
500 within two decades. See Bebchuk and Hirst, supra note 7, at 739, 741. 
11 Many believe that trustees and other fiduciaries “have come under increasing pressure to use environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) factors in making investment decisions.” See Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 
Stanford L. Rev. 381, at 381 (2020). Although there may be pressure (particularly in the case of public pension funds, 
which are politically accountable), this article will assert that sound economic reasons better explain why fiduciaries 
at large diversified investors favor ESG principles, and thus ESG investing is likely to increase for reasons unrelated 
to political pressure. Interestingly, journalists report that while European oil companies have been pressured by their 
governments to incorporate ESG criteria into their decision-making, the pressure on U.S. oil companies for the same 
outcome has come exclusively from large institutional investors (and not at all from the government). See Stanley 
Reed, “Europe’s Oil Titans Ramp Up Transition To Cleaner Energy,” The New York Times, August 17, 2020 at B-1, 
3.   
12 For a similar description of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, supra n. 11, at 388. 
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disclosure.13 This article will suggest that a fundamental economic logic explains 
their interest, which flows directly both from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(“CAPM”14) and from the just-noted fact of the high institutional common ownership 
of portfolio companies. Put simply, with high common ownership across a broad 
portfolio, it becomes rational and predictable that these institutional investors will 
make both investment and voting decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (rather than 
simply trying to maximize the value of individual stocks). This, in turn, permits the 
netting of gains and losses across the portfolio, and the implications of this transition 
are sweeping.  
How should the SEC respond (if at all) to these transitions? Many will argue 
that the SEC should keep the protection of the retail investor as its first priority, but 
this article is premised on the belief that this transition by retail investors to indexed 
investing has been salutary. In fact, the SEC should encourage (and even gently 
push) retail investors to diversify, shifting their retirement savings to diversified (and 
generally indexed) institutional intermediaries (i.e. mutual funds and pension funds). 
Still, this preference leaves unanswered our initial question: How do the 
informational needs of institutional investors and retail investors differ? How should 
the SEC respond to their differing needs? 
                                                            
13 Anecdotal evidence is abundant that diversified institutional investors, including the Big Three, are placing 
significant pressure on many companies, particularly including energy companies to expedite their dates for “carbon-
neutrality” and on all companies to achieve greater board diversity. See Condon, supra n.7; Reed, supra n.10. 
14 For the original statement of this model, see William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Finance 425 (1964); see also John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets 
and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 13 (1965). 
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This question has been approached by others, but not directly answered. A 
dozen years ago, Professor Donald Langevoort focused on the transition from retail 
to institutional markets at the time of the SEC’s 75th Anniversary.15 His 
recommendations seemed to suggest that the U.S. market would likely become more 
like the European securities market, which, as he accurately observed, was 
characterized by (1) “light touch” enforcement, (2) a lesser disclosure burden 
emphasizing principles-based disclosure, and (3) considerably less reliance on ex post 
litigation to enforce disclosure norms. Others challenged him,16 but the greater 
problem with Professor Langevoort’s thesis was his unfortuitous timing. Shortly after 
he wrote, the 2008 financial crisis broke and, in response, even the U.K. abandoned 
“light touch” regulation. While differences in enforcement intensity still separate the 
U.S. and Europe (and will likely continue),17 a greater consensus exists today over 
the need for stronger enforcement and a mandatory disclosure system. 
This article will therefore skirt the topic of enforcement and instead focus on 
how the disclosure needs of retail and institutional investors may differ. Here, other 
transitions are also relevant. Increasingly, private offerings that are exempt from the 
Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter, the “1933 Act”) have come to rival public offerings 
as a means for issuers to raise capital. Indeed, in recent years, the number of private 
offerings and the total capital raised in them has exceeded the corresponding figures 
                                                            
15 See Langevoort, supra note 3. 
16 See Evans, supra note 5. 
17 For a detailed examination of relative enforcement intensity between the U.S., the U.K., and Europe, see John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007). 
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for public offerings subject to the 1933 Act.18 Because these exempt offerings require 
little disclosure (at least as a legal matter19), this might seem to imply that 
institutional investors need less information. Yet, a confounding fact interferes with 
this simple a conclusion: the character of the disclosure actually made in offerings 
done pursuant to Rule 144A (the exempt private offering favored by large public 
issuers20) closely resembles the character of the information in a registration 
statement filed pursuant to the 1933 Act. In particular, the issuer’s disclosures in a 
Rule 144A offering typically follows the same standardized format. Although no 
precise metric exists that proves that the same quantum of information is present in 
both exempt and registered offerings, institutional investors appear to want (and 
implicitly demand) roughly the same information, and they prefer it presented in the 
same standardized format. The inference best drawn from this evidence is that 
diversified institutional investors want at least as much information (and probably 
more) as do individual investors, and they want a standardized format to enhance 
the comparability of disclosures across companies. Particularly as they come to make 
decisions on a portfolio-wide basis, diversified institutions will increasingly want to 
                                                            
18 The principal exemption for private placements is Regulation D (17 C.F.R. §230.500 to 508). The number of “Reg 
D” offerings has exceeded the number of public equity offerings by a 30 to 1 margin. See Coffee, Sale and Henderson, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: Cases and Materials (13th ed. 2015) at p.368. The aggregate amount raised in private 
markets has also exceeded that raised in public markets in some years. For example, in 2012, $1.7 trillion was raised 
in private markets versus $1.2 trillion in public markets in registered offerings. Id. 
19 Under Rule 502(b) of Regulation D (17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)), the issuer need not provide information to purchasers 
when selling to “accredited investors.” Typically, such offerings are as a result limited to “accredited investors,” which 
term is defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D to require only a modest $1 million net worth or an annual income for the 
two most recent years equal to or exceeding $200,000. See Rule 501(a)(5) and (6). With inflation, this test has become 
much more permissive and now includes millions of investors. As a generalization, the purchasers in Reg D offerings 
are generally individuals and smaller institutions, and the disclosure they receive tends to be quite modest. 
20 See Rule 144A (17 C.F.R. §230.144A). This rule permits private sales to institutional buyers that own and invest at 
least $100 million in securities of unrelated issuers (in short, the profile of a large institutional investor). The volume 
and quality of the disclosure in Rule 144A offerings is much higher than in Reg D offerings to smaller investors, 
suggesting that large institutions are demanding more information based on their market power.  
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know and compare the gains and losses at multiple firms in their portfolio that will 
result from voting decisions that they may make. In contrast, undiversified 
shareholders have no such need to make similar comparisons.   
This article will offer a number of conclusions that are brief and blunt; to be 
brief, it is necessary to be blunt. Organizationally, Part I of this article will focus on 
the informational needs of the institutional investor (and particularly, the fully 
diversified institution). How do their needs and priorities differ from those of the 
retail individual investor? Relying on the CAPM, it will suggest that institutional 
investors are more concerned with “systematic risk” than are individual investors 
and that ESG disclosures overlap with systematic risk to a greater degree than has 
been previously recognized. Part II will then return to the individual retail investor, 
who certainly remains on the scene and is the dominant investor in smaller 
companies that offer less liquidity.21 What new needs (and fears) might the retail 
investor reasonably have in the contemporary investment environment? Here, a 
partial answer will be that, although institutions tend to be tolerant of risk and 
skeptical of diversification, individual investors rationally have the reverse 
preferences. Finally, Part III will turn to the growth of ESG disclosures. Although 
such disclosures are now becoming mandatory in Europe, ESG disclosures remain 
optional and voluntary in the U.S., with the SEC taking no firm position on them.22 
                                                            
21 Institutional investors greatly value liquidity: namely, the ability to buy or sell the stock without affecting its market 
price. Institutional investors also want to make investments in the multi-million dollar range and are not interested in 
smaller investments. Thus, they tend to invest mainly in large capitalization stocks. 
22 The SEC has not implemented any ESG requirements, leaving them entirely voluntary. For a good summary of the 
SEC’s positions (and the reasons for it), see Thomas L. Hazen, Social Issues In The Spotlight: The Increasing Need 
To Improve Publicly-Held Companies’ CSR And ESG Disclosure, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id= 3615327 
(June 29, 2020). 
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What explains the pronounced interest of diversified institutions in ESG? Equally 
important, what obstacles exist under current law to the fiduciaries who make 
investment and voting decisions at institutional investors and who wish to rely on 
this information? How should the SEC assist, encourage, or otherwise regulate ESG 
disclosures? 
More descriptive than prescriptive, this brief article intends to make some 
logical (and possibly provocative) connections that do not seem to have been clearly 
made to date, but it will not attempt to draft SEC rules or micromanage the 
Commission. It does, however, suggest a general direction for disclosure reform and 
submits that this new direction is consistent with economic logic.  
I. THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR: 
HOW ARE THEY DIFFERENT? 
 
It is traditional to begin any discussion that relies on “law and economics” with 
the mandatory observation that “one size does not fit all.” Not all institutional 
investors are alike. Some mutual funds and many hedge funds are “stock pickers;” 
they engage in active trading, and believe they can outperform the efficient market. 
Generally, they are wrong, but not invariably (which could be explained by the fact 
that some may have access to private information). Still, a larger percentage of 
institutional investors are diversified (or even indexed) than are individual investors, 
and typically these highly diversified investors do not attempt to outperform the 
market (but rather to mirror it cheaply). 
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Given their dominance, it is prudent to ask what kinds of information does the 
fully diversified investor want? Here, one needs to turn to the CAPM, and its most 
relevant teaching for our purposes is that diversification reduces “unsystematic” risk, 
but not “systematic” risk.23 Unsystematic risk is that risk that is unique to a company 
or industry; for example, a company’s (or an industry’s) technology may be outdated 
or outperformed by a new emerging technology (e.g., natural gas or solar power may 
become cheaper than oil or coal-based power). But some risks affect all companies: 
inflation may increase; a banking crisis may disrupt finance and cut off credit across 
the board; or, more recently, a pandemic may require all companies to suspend 
operations. Diversification does not offer meaningful protection from these risks.  
The CAPM assumes that the capital markets ignore unsystematic risk in 
pricing the value of a financial asset (including corporate stock) because diversified 
investors do not bear unsystematic risk. Because diversification involves little cost or 
effort for investors with regard to the common stocks of large public companies, the 
price of a stock, according to this model, is set by diversified investors, who need only 
consider the company’s systematic risk. In effect, if two companies have the same 
expected return, the fact that one has higher unsystematic risk will not affect their 
relative valuation to the extent the market price is set by diversified investors who 
do not bear this risk. Put differently, investors cannot demand a higher return for 
bearing unsystematic risk that they could have easily diversified away. 
                                                            
23 For a concise discussion of this difference in the standard finance textbook, see Richard Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, 
& Franklin Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 168-170 (10th ed. 2011). 
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The key implication here is that the price of a financial asset will be determined 
by the asset’s systematic risk compared to the risk of the market as a whole. To be 
sure, the CAPM has been much criticized and may overstate.24 But, even its critics 
believe that it points in the right direction and is roughly accurate.25 The CAPM’s 
immediate implication for our topic of disclosure policy is that, as the market becomes 
increasingly dominated by diversified investors, these investors will focus primarily 
on systematic risk. But systematic risk has never been a key focus of the SEC’s retail 
investor-oriented disclosure policy. 
Let us assume that the CAPM makes assumptions that many will regard as 
overstated.26 But, even if we need to take it with a substantial grain of salt, the CAPM 
still legitimately implies that the SEC needs to modernize its disclosure policy and 
focus more seriously on systematic risk. This does not mean that the SEC need ignore 
unsystematic risk (because many investors will remain less than fully diversified), 
but it does suggest that diversified investors who constitute a majority of the market 
have an unmet disclosure need. 
Skeptics may respond to this claim that if there were any such demand for 
more disclosure about systematic risk, we would have heard investors clamoring for 
such information? But arguably they are clamoring. Increasingly, the largest and 
most diversified institutional investors (led by BlackRock, State Street and 
                                                            
24 For such a critique, see Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and 
Bonds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4-5 (1993) (finding the CAPM to be empirically inadequate).  
25 In a series of articles, they proposed supplementing, the original CAPM with a few additional factors. See Eugene 
F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Pricing Mode, 116 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2015). Thus, although they believe 
the CAPM needs to be supplemented, they do not reject it as a starting point. 
26 See text and notes supra at nn. 24 and 25. 
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Vanguard) are not only pressing public companies to provide greater ESG disclosures, 
but they are acting on these disclosures through both voting and litigation.27 
Although “ESG” can mean different things to different persons, its core meaning 
involves disclosures relating to corporate sustainability and climate change. Today, 
these words fall near dead-center in terms of what may determine a company’s 
exposure to systematic risk. 
Indeed, climate change may present the clearest example of systematic risk. 
Although it will not affect all companies the same (i.e., the risk is heterogeneous), 
investors cannot escape it through diversification. That is, there is no obvious class 
of companies whose stock will go up as the result of global warming so as to 
compensate diversified investors for those stocks that go down. Given that they are 
exposed to this risk, diversified investors rationally need to estimate its impact on 
their portfolios. Further, they may want to take action (either by voting, litigation, or 
persuasion) to induce change that reduces such risk (even if it causes losses to some 
companies in their portfolio, so long as the action taken implies greater gains than 
losses to the portfolio). 
Much like Moliére’s gentleman who was surprised to learn that he was 
speaking prose without knowing it, the SEC may already be focusing more on 
systematic risk than it realizes. Recently, the SEC has concentrated on Covid-19 
disclosures, asking all public companies to explain how the pandemic is affecting 
                                                            
27 For an article that shows how a group of six institutional shareholders (including, the above three) were able to press 
both ExxonMobil and Chevron to support climate change reforms that these firms had previously opposed, see 
Condon, supra note 7. Not only are broadly diversified firms seeking such disclosures, they are also acting upon them 
as well, often by suing portfolio companies. See Alexander Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
1453 (2020). 
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them.28 Of course, pandemics represent a form of systematic risk as diversification 
cannot protect investors’ portfolios. Perhaps (unlike Moliére’s gentleman), the SEC 
does not care that it is already speaking prose (by requiring some disclosure relating 
to systematic risk), but it needs to be encouraged to go further and develop its fluency 
in this new language.  
Skeptics will again respond that not all ESG disclosure relates to systematic 
risk. For example, ESG disclosures often focus on racial diversity and inclusiveness. 
How, they will assert, can that be called systematic risk disclosure? They may argue 
further that such disclosure is aimed at, and demanded by, activists and 
stakeholders, not mainstream shareholders. In the short-run, this may be an 
understandable question, but over the long-run, these disclosures arguably do relate 
to the viability of our corporate system. If the corporate system cannot offer 
inclusiveness and promote diversity, it may become subject to a political risk that 
capitalism (or, at least, contemporary corporate governance) will be politically 
challenged and could conceivably yield to a more state-run system of corporate 
governance. To some degree, such a transition seems to be already occurring in 
Europe and the U.K.29 Again, diversification could not protect investors against this 
                                                            
28 There has been a continuing stream of SEC statements since March, 2020. See, Division of Corporation Finance, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “CF Disclosure Guidelines: Topic No. 9A, “Coronavirus (Covid-19) - 
Disclosure Considerations Regarding Operations, Liquidity, and Capital Requirements” (June 23, 2020). For a brief 
overview, see “Updating Public Traded Company Disclosures for Covid-19,” LAW360 (March 20, 2020). 
29 Nations can be located on a corporate governance continuum ranging from “shareholder-centric” systems (of which 
the U.S. is the leading example) to “stakeholder-centric” systems (into which category most European nations fall). 
In Europe and the U.K., there has been recent movement towards increasing the rights of, and duties owed to, 
stakeholders. One step in this direction has been the recent popularity of “stewardship codes” for investors. See 
Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist, Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497 
(2018); Jennifer G. Hill, Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Norms in Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 5 J. of Int’l & Comp L. Rev. 163 (2020); Katherine Jackson, Toward a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory 
of Corporate Governance: Comparative Analysis, 7 Hastings Bus L. J. 309 (2018). 
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risk of political upheaval, which could directly threaten the traditional investor’s goal 
of shareholder wealth maximization. 
One last point about “systematic risk” needs to be underscored: its relationship 
to securities law’s bedrock concept of materiality is both close and clear for diversified 
investors. Because systematic risks cannot be diversified away by investors, 
information about such risks arguably becomes more material to diversified investors 
than information about “unsystematic risks,” both because institutional investors are 
in theory only exposed to “systematic risk” and because they (and only they) may be 
able to take corrective action to minimize externalities.30 In truth, this is the same 
distinction as between a risk that is insurable and one that is uninsurable; obviously, 
a risk that is uninsurable more seriously threatens investors. For example, a fire will 
not destroy a major bank holding corporation, but a 2008 style financial catastrophe 
could. Similarly, a pandemic or rapidly accelerating climate change are unhedgeable 
risks that can produce far greater damage to investors’ portfolios than can any firm-
specific disaster (even an Enron) -- but they are also susceptible to direct action by 
coordinated shareholders (through litigation, proxy fights, or the threat of 
divestment). 
                                                            
30 For discussions of the magnitude of climate change as a leading systematic risk and investors’ concerns about it, 
see Inst. For Sustainable Leadership, Univ. of Cambridge, “Unhedgable Risk: How Climate Change Sentiment 
Impacts Investment;” Stefano Battison, A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System, 7 Nature Climate Change 283, 
288 (2017); Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 131 J. Fin. Econ. 693 (2018). For our purposes, “materiality” is defined 
for the federal securities laws in remarkably broad language, which was set forth in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, at 231 (1988) (stating that “an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”). In short, if reasonable investors want the 
information, it becomes presumptively material. My premise here is only that mega-sized institutional investors (such 
as the Big Three) are objectively reasonable.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678197
 15 
 
II. THE RETAIL INVESTOR: THE RELEVANCE OF OPTION PRICING 
THEORY 
 
Institutional and individual investors disagree over an important issue of 
business policy. Institutional investors do not want the corporate issuer to diversify 
or to hold a conglomerate-like portfolio of unrelated companies in different industries. 
Because the institutional investor can easily diversify its own holdings, and because 
it is redundant to diversify on both the investor and corporate levels, diversified 
investors want to streamline the corporation’s portfolio and sell or spin off unrelated 
assets. From an economic perspective, only synergies between divisions can justify a 
corporation in holding investments in multiple unrelated companies. Still, many 
individual investors do not diversify and therefore do not share this policy preference. 
Why do they not diversify? This presents something of a mystery, but they may lack 
adequate resources or their failure may be the product of simple ignorance. 
Regardless, such undiversified individual investors logically benefit from corporate 
diversification, as it reduces the risk of the investments they hold. 
Today, activist hedge funds regularly “engage” target corporations, buying a 
5% or slightly greater stake and then seeking to pressure the target into reducing its 
degree of diversification (and simultaneously increasing leverage, often through stock 
buybacks).31 Generally, these campaigns produce an immediate positive stock market 
reaction when the activist hedge fund crosses the 5% ownership threshold and files 
the mandatory Schedule 13D (which typically announces both its ownership position 
                                                            
31 For a detailed discussion of this pattern, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545 (2016). 
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and its proposed plans to reduce diversification and increase leverage).32 Although 
this stock price reaction suggests shareholders as a group are made better off by these 
campaigns, undiversified investors may arguably be made worse off. As “buy and 
hold” investors,33 the retail individual investor is unlikely to sell and probably will 
continue to hold a stock that is now subject to higher risk at the corporate level 
(because of reduced diversification). Does the increase in expected return justify this 
increased risk? No simple conclusion is justified here.34 
Because the CAPM assumes that the market price of a widely traded stock is 
determined by the interaction of large, fully diversified institutional investors, the 
small retail investor will not have much impact on the stock price (even if some such 
investors do sell). Because the stock price is thus unlikely to decline (as institutional 
investors are happy with this new trade-off of risk and return), these individual 
investors need disclosure that makes clear to them that they may now be subject to 
greater risk. Arguably, if the SEC continues its traditional policy of protecting retail 
investors, the SEC should mandate disclosures that warn these investors of this 
increased risk. Effectively, they should use this opportunity to prod investors toward 
                                                            
32 Although an intense debate continues over the long-term impact of hedge fund activism, a consensus exists that the 
filing with the SEC (usually on Schedule 13D) of a disclosure announcing that the activist has taken a 5% (or greater) 
position in the stock of a publicly held company is associated with a positive abnormal stock return. See Alon Brav et 
al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1736-37 (2008). Beyond 
that point, empirical conclusions are contested. 
33 Retail investors tend to be “buy and hold” investors (who do not trade actively) probably because they face higher 
trading costs than institutional investors who, because they trade in volume, receive quantity discounts. 
34 The taste for risk is subjective and individuals differ. Thus, although a hypothetical 5% stock market gain might 
induce some (or even most) investors to accept the increased risk associated with increased leverage or reduced 
diversification, it may not please all shareholders. Also, the increased risk may not be evident to many retail 
shareholders (who see only the increased stock price). This conclusion will be regarded as heresy by neo-classical 
economists who assume that all shareholders favor policies that increase the share price. See Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 69-71 (1991). This, however, ignores that 
rational investors will focus on the risk-return ratio and vary in their reactions. 
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greater diversification. Nothing in existing disclosure rules provides for anything 
resembling such disclosure or such advice. 
This point about the increase risk associated with hedge fund activism needs 
to be generalized. The famous (and Nobel Prize-winning) work of Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes on option pricing theory begins from their insight that, once a public 
company takes on significant debt, its common stock can be modeled (and is best 
understood) as an option on the corporation’s assets.35 That is, the common 
stockholders collectively hold an option, which, on the maturity of the debt, allows 
them either to let the corporation default on its debt (which is the equivalent of letting 
their option expire) or to pay the debt off (which is the equivalent of exercising their 
option). In this view, the “real” owners of the corporation are its debt holders, who 
have no choice (because the shareholders have limited liability and cannot be held 
personally liable if the firm defaults on its debt). Unlike the debtholders, the 
stockholders do have the choice of either allowing the company to default (and thus 
turning the company over to the creditors) or of paying off the debt (and in effect 
exercising the option). Presumably, they will make the choice that maximizes their 
own interests (possibly at the expense of creditors and other stakeholders).  
The immediate relevance of this point involves the incentive effects on the 
option holder (i.e., the common shareholders). As option holders, they can be expected 
to act rationally so as to maximize the value of their option. What does that imply? 
                                                            
35 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637 (1973). For 
an accessible explanation of option pricing, see Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS 
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT (1993) at 252-257. 
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Under the Black/Scholes model, the most important factor in determining the value 
of an option is the variance in the value of the underlying asset (here, the 
corporation’s assets). In short, the greater the variance in expected corporate returns, 
the greater the value of the option. This may seem counter-intuitive, because greater 
variance in expected returns is unattractive to debtholders and reduces the value of 
the corporation’s assets in their hands. Still, a critical insight of the option pricing 
model is that the common stockholders, as the holder of an option, can increase the 
value of their option by increasing the variance associated with the corporation’s 
assets and investments. More bluntly, this means that by increasing the riskiness of 
the corporation’s investments, they benefit themselves (as the option holder) at the 
expense of the corporation’s creditors and other stakeholders. 
Thus, we now have a scenario for opportunism by the shareholders: if they take 
on riskier investments, or leverage up the company, they gain and the creditors lose. 
Of course, creditors can resist by insisting on protective covenants in loan agreements 
and bond indentures, but these are in declining use.36 Even if creditors could 
negotiate contractual protections against increased leverage, it is much harder to 
prevent their corporate borrower from taking on riskier investments and making 
higher-risk bets. Such restrictions would be hard to draft and would be resisted 
intensely by corporate managers because it would tie their hands, denying them 
needed flexibility over an extended period.  
                                                            
36 Debt covenants became disfavored in the 1980s, and empirical surveys found that large public corporations had 
successfully avoided them. See Morey McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law. 413 (1986); 
see also William Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 Duke L. J. 
92. 
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In this light, the behavior of activist hedge funds in seeking to reduce corporate 
diversification and/or to increase leverage (or otherwise withdraw funds from the 
firm) makes perfect sense from the standpoint of the Black/Scholes model. The hedge 
funds are essentially seeking to increase risk to benefit the majority of shareholders 
at the expense of creditors (and other stakeholders). Although the hedge funds are 
not themselves diversified, they know that they will be rewarded by a share price 
increase if they propose an action (such as increasing leverage or reducing 
diversification) that will benefit the diversified shareholders that they are serving.  
Although there has been a voluminous and heated debate over the practices 
and ethics of activist hedge funds,37 this debate has usually been framed in terms of 
whether hedge funds have a “short-term” perspective that contrasts with the 
allegedly “long-term” perspective of the target corporation’s managers. Without 
denying that there could be such differences between activist shareholders and 
managers,38 it is simpler (and theoretically more elegant) to focus instead on the 
enhanced value to the option held by the shareholders as the result of accepting 
increased risk. 
Possibly, some will respond: if this is so obvious, why didn’t the target 
management do this themselves and accept increased risk and lesser diversification? 
                                                            
37 For representative positions, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (2015); Coffee and Palia, supra note 29; and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds 
When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate 
Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870 (2017). 
38 Standard compensation formulas in the hedge fund industry (which typically annually award hedge fund managers 
20% or more of the fund’s gains) do give hedge fund managers considerable reason to focus on the short-run. 
Moreover, hedge fund managers are aware that their investor clients can easily move funds to another hedge fund if 
they do not deliver immediate gains. In contrast, corporate managers are conventionally assumed to have a longer 
term (and more risk-averse) perspective because of their locked-in human capital. 
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Why have only activist hedge funds proposed this? Here, there is a simple answer: 
corporate managers have firm-specific human capital invested in the firm, which they 
cannot easily hedge. Put simply, shareholders hold multiple stocks, but managers 
have only one job. Managers will resist the risk of increased leverage or diminished 
diversification, because it exposes them to potential bankruptcy and the loss of their 
human capital. Thus, shareholders make superior risk bearers. 
Today, activist hedge funds have learned that if they propose a specific 
scenario for increasing risk (such as by following a riskier investment policy, selling 
off corporate assets that mainly provide unneeded diversification, or increasing 
leverage, buybacks and dividends), they will find it easy to sell this policy to 
diversified institutional shareholders. This motivation to increase risk and reduce 
diversification did not begin with activist hedge funds. “Bust-up” takeover bidders 
did the same thing in the late 1980’s. But these bidders were chilled by the poison 
pill, state takeover laws, and judicial developments.39 The evidence is clear that 
activist hedge funds can today compel target managements to negotiate their 
demands and place the hedge fund’s agents on the target’s board.40 More importantly, 
the activist fund spends far less, fares far better, and achieves results far more 
quickly than the traditional hostile bidder. As a result, the activist hedge fund has 
                                                            
39 During the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of the poison pill in Moran v. Household 
International, Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del. 1985), and after Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated, 571 
A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1990) it seemed (at least for a time) that to uphold a “just say no defense” would be valid in Delaware. 
Possibly as a consequence, hostile takeovers declined, following 1990 and, other techniques (including hedge fund 
engagements) grew.  
40 For a fuller discussion of the tactics and success of hedge fund campaigns, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, 
Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director 
Goes on the Board?, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 381, 395-408 (2019). 
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largely replaced the hostile bidder, but the implications for the undiversified retail 
investor remain the same: increased risk is generally contrary to their preferences.  
Although the clear winners here are diversified shareholders and activist 
funds, the clear losers are not only creditors, managers and stakeholders. In addition, 
the undiversified retail investor is a bystander whose fate is less easily summed up. 
This shareholder may sometimes win and sometimes lose, depending upon how much 
risk the shareholder is willing to accept. The bottom line then is that not only 
creditors are placed at risk by such practices, but undiversified retail shareholders 
are forced to bear more risk than they may want or can recognize.  
How (if at all) should the SEC protect these investors? The long term answer 
may be that retail investors should be prodded (or at least encouraged) by the SEC to 
diversify. But the SEC’s ability at investor education is open to doubt.41 The public 
does not respond well to the Government’s paternalistic advice. To the extent that 
investor education falls short (as I expect it will), the second best policy may be to 
require greater disclosure alerting the individual investor to the risk and dangers 
associated with hedge fund campaigns, reduced diversification, and increased 
leverage. This policy, of course, can only be pursued on a case-by-case basis, but the 
end goal should be to encourage greater diversification by retail investors.  
                                                            
41 Unquestionably, retail investors need investor education, but it is highly questionable that the SEC can teach this 
course successfully. Part of the problem is that for every dollar spent by the SEC toward this end, far more will be 
spent by mutual funds, investment advisers, and the advocates of crowdfunding, all predicting that they can find you 
the next Microsoft or Apple. A more likely candidate to teach the value of diversification are the private proponents 
of diversification, such as most notably Vanguard. 
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III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ESG DISCLOSURES: CAN FIDUCIARIES USE 
THIS INFORMATION? 
 
Although the term “ESG” is of fairly recent vintage, the concept has been 
around for forty years or longer.42 Still, a paradox remains: even if investors want 
such information, can fiduciaries, acting on their behalf, use it lawfully in either 
investing or voting decisions? The problem is that fiduciaries are legally barred from 
relying on ethical considerations, except under special circumstances. Conservatives 
have long argued that fiduciaries (and particularly trustees subject to ERISA or 
common law standards) are not permitted to rely on ethical or moral judgments (or 
socially desirable goals), unless they can conclude, based on clear evidence, that 
pursuit of such goals will work to the financial advantage of their beneficiaries.43 
From this perspective, ESG data can be considered by fiduciaries only if they can 
reasonably find that it satisfies a risk-return test that enables them to improve their 
portfolio’s overall risk-adjusted return.44 But this is a more complex exercise than it 
initially appears. This section will argue that the SEC can play a useful role in 
resolving this dilemma. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ESG. The idea that investors should consider the social 
behavior and impact of the companies they invest in has a long history, and some 
trace it back as far as the sermons of John Wesley, the founder of the Methodist 
                                                            
42 For a good history of the rise of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 395-399. 
43 This debate can be easily traced back to the 1980s, when the key issue involved divestment campaigns aimed at 
South Africa’s apartheid policies. For the conservative view that social investing was illegitimate, see John H. 
Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72 (1980). Professors 
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff appear to be following in this tradition (with some modifications) 
44 This is essentially the position of Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11, 
at 453. 
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Church, who advised his followers that they could not ethically invest in companies 
that profited from the slave trade.45 Similarly, some mutual funds have long 
employed a social screen to winnow out those companies that made anti-social 
products. The first such U.S. fund, Pioneer Investments, dates to 1928 and remains 
in business today, continually stressing its commitment to Christian values.46 The 
broader concept of socially responsible investing (or “SRI”) flowered in the 1980s, 
when the issue of South African apartheid provoked a crisis and caused ethical 
investors to seek to disinvest companies that were active in South Africa.47 Such 
ethical investing was always in tension with trust fiduciary law, which requires a 
trustee to consider only the interests of the beneficiary.48 This “sole interest rule” is 
intended to protect beneficiaries from fiduciaries who might subordinate the 
beneficiaries’ financial interests to those of political or social groups with whom the 
fiduciary sympathized. Legally, the “sole interest rule” implied that the trustee had 
to prefer investments with superior risk-adjusted returns, regardless of the social 
impact of the corporate issuer. Nervous that they might run afoul of the law, many 
risk-averse fiduciaries shied away from SRI investing.49 
                                                            
45 Id. at 392. 
46 Id. at 392-393. 
47 Id. at 393-395. 
48 Under what is known as the “sole interest rule,” a trustee must “administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiaries.” 3 Restatement (Third) of Trusts §78(1). Under a comment to this section, the Restatement adds that 
“the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries not to be influenced by the interests of any third person or by motives other 
than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust,” 3 Restatement of Trusts §78(1) cmt.f. See also Unif. Trust Code 
§802(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2000). If the trustee acts based on mixed motives, “an irrefutable presumption of 
wrongdoing” arises. See Daniel Fischel & John Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive 
Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1114-15 (1988). As noted later, however, a plaintiff will still have to prove 
damages, which can be a considerable hurdle. 
49 One recent study surveying 310 fiduciaries found that 47% believed that the use of ESG criteria either conflicted or 
might conflict with their fiduciary duty. See Fi360, ESG Survey for Fi360 Designees 2 (2009). For other recent studies, 
see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 385 n. 7. 
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To bring SRI investing into the mainstream, something had to be done, and 
predictably clever lawyers devised an answer. Conceptually, they “rebranded” SRI 
investing and converted it into ESG investing by asserting that consideration of the 
“governance factors” associated with public corporations would enable the fiduciary 
to identify superior investments and enhance risk-adjusted return.50 By adding 
governance to the mix, they argued, one not only did good (ethically), but one also did 
better (financially).51 This in turn enabled law firms to opine to their clients that ESG 
investing was fully compatible with the trustee’s fiduciary obligations.52 A few went 
even further and suggested that consideration of ESG factors might be mandatory.53 
Necessity is often the mother of invention, and the modest claim here advanced 
is merely that the need to calm the fears of risk-averse trustees best explains the 
addition of “governance” factors to environmental and social ones in order to convert 
SRI into ESG. Whatever the motive, this rebranding seems to have worked and in a 
brief period brought ESG into the investment mainstream. As of late 2019, some 
1,900 asset managers (including some of the world’s largest) have signed the PRI’s 
                                                            
50 I borrow the term “rebranding” from Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11 at 388. A key moment in this semantic 
transition from SRI to ESG came in 2005 with the release of a report sponsored by a UN working group and prepared 
by the international law firm of Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer, which asserted that ESG investing was not only 
consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary duties, but was “arguably required in all jurisdictions.” See UNEP FIN. 
INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND 
GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUITONAL INVESTMENT at 13 (2005). See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra 
note 11, at 389. 
51 An influential study in 2003 by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Merrick gave considerable credibility to the 
claim that governance factors did relate to firm performance. See Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107, 114-29 (2003). See also, Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance, 
22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783 (2009). 
52 The Freshfields opinion noted earlier, supra n. 50, is one example. 
53 See UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE, supra note 50, at 13; Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary 
Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. Colo. L. Rev. 731, 734-36 (2019). 
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statement of principles endorsing ESG investing;54 hundreds of ESG indices have 
been published that provide ESG ratings on individual companies;55 and Delaware 
and Oregon have amended their trust law to specifically address and facilitate ESG 
investing.56 Even the major index funds, including BlackRock and Vanguard, which 
ordinarily ignore firm-specific factors as “indexed investors,” are now proclaiming 
that they will consider some ESG issues, such as climate change.57 
B. THE REMAINING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY. Still, problems persist. Although the law 
in Europe has been sufficiently revised and clarified to make ESG investing appear 
safe for even the most risk-averse trustee,58 U.S. fiduciary law still imposes in most 
states a “sole interest rule” that instructs the fiduciary to consider only the interests 
of the beneficiary (and thus not to give weight to the interest of others, including, the 
billions who may be affected by adverse climate change).59 Of course, the 
reformulation of ESG was designed to show that ESG, as revised, could improve risk-
adjusted returns, thus satisfying a hard-nosed economic test, even without giving 
weight to collateral benefits to others. Some scholars buy this argument and consider 
                                                            
54 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11, at 387 (citing Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatory Directory, 
updated 11 2019 (2019)). Of these 1,900, the majority were European asset managers, showing the greater acceptance 
of ESG investing in Europe. 
55 Id. at 387. 
56 In 2018, Delaware amended its trust law to authorize ESG investing if it is authorized in the trust instrument. See 
Del. Code Ann., at 12, §3303(a)(4). See also Or. Rev. Stat. §§130.020, .755. These are referenced only as straws in 
the wind, and not to suggest that they resolve all issues. 
57 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 386-387. 
58 European regulators have generally accepted and encouraged ESG investing. See Press Release, Eur. Ins. & 
Occupational Pensions Auth., “EIOPA Issues Opinions on Governance and Risk Management of Pension Funds (July 
10, 2019, 3:00PM) https://perma.cc/M3YG-TFT3 (urging national regulatory authorities within the EU to “encourage 
pension funds to consider the impact of their long-term investment decisions and activities on ESG factors”). See also 
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11, at 387.  
59 See text and notes supra at notes 48-49. 
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ESG to no longer be controversial,60 but others continue to have doubts. Most notably, 
Professors Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff have drawn a sharp 
distinction between (1) ESG investing based on moral or ethical reasons or to achieve 
various collateral benefits (such as, I suppose, saving the Earth), and (2) ESG 
investing intended to improve risk-adjusted returns.61 
This distinction between (in their words) “collateral benefit” ESG investing and 
“risk-return” ESG investing seemingly makes everything depend on the fiduciary’s 
motive. Realists will, of course, recognize that, once risk-averse fiduciaries are 
properly advised as to the law, they will express the legally proper motive and deny 
the legally improper motive. (Hey guys, isn’t that what lawyers are for?). Thus, under 
this approach, the practical risk of fiduciary liability seems relatively small. 
Still, the test proposed by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff would actually require 
considerably more than just a proper motive. They would require the prudent trustee 
to conclude, before investing based on any special ESG factor, that the “capital 
markets consistently misprice the factor in a predictable manner that can be 
exploited net of any trading and diversification costs.”62 Although this test purports 
to permit ESG investing, it may well be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Its very demanding 
standard about mispricing may be nearly impossible for most trustees to satisfy. In 
effect, the trustee must determine, first, that ESG factors relate to firm performance 
                                                            
60 See Gary, supra n. 53. Professor Gary served as the Reporter for the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act, which alone makes her a significant voice in this field. The Principles for Responsible Investment (or 
“PRI”) represents probably the leading statement of the necessity for fiduciaries to adopt ESG factors into their 
investment analysis. It has obtained over 1,900 asset manager endorsements of its statement of principles. 
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11, at 387. 
61 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11. 
62 Id. at 451. 
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in the case of a specific company, and, second, that this factor has been sufficiently 
mispriced that the fiduciary can exploit this mispricing (net of trading and 
diversification costs).63 
Although I agree with them that ESG investing is not mandatory and that 
prudent trustees can reasonably conclude that they cannot outperform the market 
(as the Supreme Court has also observed in a relevant recent decision64), the 
possibility still seems remote that any court, either state or federal, would second 
guess and hold liable trustees who do decide to engage in ESG investing in the belief 
that it will enable them to achieve a superior portfolio. Courts are not suspicious of 
professional trustees, and, absent a personal self-interest on the part of the fiduciary, 
they have little reason to apply any enhanced scrutiny standard. Nor is there any 
clear history of courts intervening in this private world to impose liability. 
Nonetheless, the fact that I view the legal risk associated with ESG investing 
as modest does not necessarily mean that risk-averse trustees will agree, particularly 
when recognized experts, such as Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, are warning them. Thus, 
even though the risk may be small, some risk-averse trustees could simply decide to 
avoid the problem and stick to passive investing.65 
C. THE IMPACT OF A PORTFOLIO-WIDE PERSPECTIVE. What is the best way out of 
this quandary? Here, we need to recognize that the new high level of common 
ownership enables diversified institutional investors to take concerted action on a 
                                                            
63 Id. at 390, 450-453. 
64 See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhofer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2019). 
65 Some trustees appear to take exactly this position. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra n. 11, at 385 and n. 7. 
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portfolio-wide basis. Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff seem to ignore this 
possibility, but it may allow fiduciaries to engage in ESG investing in full compliance 
with the “sole interest rule.” Suppose that Big Three-level index funds were to push 
the major energy companies to adopt tighter standards on emissions and to advance 
the date on which they would become carbon neutral. Their justification might be 
that, although this would reduce the financial returns for some portfolio companies 
(i.e., coal companies), it would benefit other companies (for example, those who 
produced solar power, wind power or nuclear power). Such pressure has in fact been 
successfully applied to Royal Dutch Shell and others in 2018.66 Economically, such 
interventions would make sense -- if the losses to the traditional energy companies 
were outweighed by gains to the other firms in the portfolio. As Madison Condon has 
framed it:  
“A rational owner would use his power to internalize 
externalities so long as its share of the cost to the 
externality-causing firms are lower than the benefits that 
accrue to the entire portfolio from the elimination of the 
externality.”67 
  
In the past, even a large institutional investor could not hope to cause a shift in 
corporate policy at a portfolio firm. But in the new age, where the Big Three usually 
votes 25% of the shares voted just by themselves (and can reach out to their fellow 
institutions for more support), they seem able to enforce their will effectively. 
                                                            
66 In late 2018, Royal Dutch Shell was pressured by a coalition of institutional investors to set emission reduction 
targets to reduce its carbon footprint by 20% by 2035 and 50% by 2050. It had previously opposed these targets and 
described them as “onerous and cumbersome,” but once approached by this institutional coalition, it yielded quickly. 
See Condon, supra note 7, at 2. Thereafter, this same coalition next approached ExxonMobil, Chevron and BP. Id. 
67 Condon, supra note 7, at 6. 
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Moreover, the firm managers that they will seek to pressure will typically be risk-
averse and probably unwilling to jeopardize their careers by engaging in a contested 
proxy fight with these powerful institutions. 
Of course, as fiduciaries, the trustees or similar personnel at these 
institutional investors would have to make an informed judgment and compare the 
costs and benefits from such action to their portfolio. But this is exactly where 
consultants will predictably be hired to perform such an analysis.68 Perhaps my 
cynicism is showing, but these consultants will usually be able to justify the requisite 
findings that their clients want. Indeed, this could become a burgeoning growth 
business for accounting firms, proxy advisor firms, and other consultants.  
This is also the juncture where the SEC could play a useful role. The SEC could 
require corporate managers to disclose data that they possessed about the costs of 
change (for example, the costs of reaching carbon neutrality by a given date). Such 
data (which increasingly exists at many large public companies) could be required to 
be disclosed in the firm’s Management Discussion & Analysis (“MD&A”).69 This would 
                                                            
68 For example, an environmental consulting firm, an accounting firm, or a proxy advisor might compare the loss to a 
major oil company (such as Royal Dutch Shell in our earlier example) from reducing its emissions or carbon footprint 
by a specified percentage to the benefits to other companies in its portfolio from achieving reduced pollution and 
postponing adverse climate change. Some asset managers appear to be making these estimates already. Schroders, a 
major asset manager, has calculated that a 4 degree increase (Centigrade) would produce “global economic losses” of 
$23 trillion over an 80 year period. See Condon, supra note 7, at 6. Because this is a short article, it will simply assert 
(and not demonstrate) that such calculations are difficult and tend to be error-prone.  
69 “Reporting companies,” which term includes most exchange-listed companies, must comply with SEC Regulation 
S-K (17 C.F.R. §229) by filing certain mandatory periodic disclosures with the SEC. Item 303 of Regulation S-K 
(“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations”) requires such a reporting 
company to “identify any known trend or known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties… that are reasonably 
likely” to produce material changes in the issuer’s liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations. If there were 
even “uncertainties” about the costs of reaching environmental targets and costs could have a material impact on 
liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations, then disclosure would be required. The point here is that the SEC 
could clarify that such disclosure was required as to major ESG topics, such as climate change, and this would inform 
and motivate fiduciaries at the major institutional investors. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678197
 30 
 
not be an aggressive step for the SEC, as it would only be requiring the disclosure of 
data in management’s possession and not mandating any position on ESG investing.  
Conceivably, one could go even a step further: arguably, fiduciaries could also 
calculate the benefits to their beneficiaries, as individuals, from reducing pollution or 
slowing climate change.70 Although under ERISA fiduciaries may be legally required 
to focus on the financial benefits to their beneficiaries, they should be able to measure 
those financial benefits on a portfolio-wide basis. Considering the personal financial 
benefits to investors (i.e., benefits unrelated to the stock price) would be more 
controversial, but arguably complies with both the “sole interest rule” and ERISA’s 
language. Again, consultants could give fiduciaries detailed estimates based on 
legitimate studies.  
The bottom line here is that trustees who reach a careful, informed position, 
based on legitimate studies, are unlikely to face any serious risk of liability. What 
such prudent trustees most need is more information -- in particular, information 
that enables them to make comparisons between companies. To illustrate, suppose 
the SEC encouraged companies to express information in terms of estimated 
benchmarks. For example, by what date did the company believe it would become 
                                                            
70 This idea that fiduciaries could serve the best interests of their beneficiaries by considering more than simply the 
impact of their actions on the individual stocks before them will trouble some, as it could quickly lead down a slippery 
slope to very subjective judgments. For example, one could look even beyond the financial interest of the beneficiaries 
and add into the calculation their beneficiaries’ personal interests as well (reducing pollution may enable the 
beneficiaries to live longer or better lives). Heretical as this may sound, two distinguished economists have endorsed 
such a test, arguing that fiduciaries should maximize not stock value, but shareholder welfare. See Oliver Hart and 
Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J. L., Fin., & Acct. 247 
(2017). Here, ERISA’s “sole interest rule” appears to require fiduciaries to focus solely on “financial benefits” (not 
personal benefits) to the beneficiaries. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhofer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014) (quoting 
29 USC §1104(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)). Still, outside of ERISA, a broader calculation of the benefit that combines financial 
and personal benefits might be possible. 
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“carbon neutral”? At what cost? Many companies have already released projected 
dates (2040, 2050, etc.) Other companies have remained silent, but if the company 
had an estimated date (which it had never publicly disclosed), the SEC could indicate 
that such information in its view was material (as could be any estimate of the costs 
involved in reaching this target date). If such disclosure of internally generated 
estimates were required in the MD&A,71 this information would also carry very little 
risk of liability under the federal securities laws.72  
Already, many securities analysts prepare rankings of public companies in 
terms of ESG criteria. The problem with such rankings is a familiar one: “Garbage 
In, Garbage Out” -- the “GIGO Effect.” Today, ESG disclosure is incomplete and 
unstandardized, with rankings that are dubious and inconsistent.73 Public disclosure 
of ESG data would at a minimum improve the quality of such rankings and ratings 
and give trustees greater confidence in relying on such data. The bottom line here is 
that more ESG data will likely produce more decisions based on ESG criteria -- and 
also greater attention being given to systematic risk. 
D. INVESTMENT VS. VOTING DECISIONS. Besides their failure to consider the 
portfolio-wide perspective, one other objection needs to be directed at Schanzenbach’s 
& Sitkoff’s very scholarly study: investment decisions and voting decisions are quite 
                                                            
71 Again, this is Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which is usually referred to as the “MD&A.” 
72 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78a et seq.) provides in its section 21E (“Application of Safe 
Harbor for Forward-Looking statements) that reporting companies (with some modest exclusions) do not have liability 
for forward-looking statements that prove false if the statement is “accompanied by a meaningful cautionary 
statements” that explain some of the factors “that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the 
forward-looking statement.” See 15 U.S.C. §78u5(c). 
73 ESG ratings often disagree, and mutual funds that emphasize their focus on ESG often score below non-ESG funds 
when subjected to objective review based on their own criteria. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 431. 
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different and viewed very differently by both ERISA and the SEC. Although the “sole 
interest rule” may apply to both (as they argue), a critical difference is that both the 
Department of Labor and the SEC require fiduciaries to vote the shares held by their 
fund, on the theory that voting rights are an asset belonging to the fund and cannot 
be wasted.74 Both agencies also recognize that voting has low costs (in contrast to 
investment decisions)75 and that fiduciaries must constantly make these decisions 
across their portfolios. As a result, both have favored a rule of reason with regard to 
voting and shareholder activism.76  
Suppose hypothetically then that an indexed mutual or pension fund owns 100 
stocks, one of which would be hurt by a shareholder resolution calling for tighter and 
                                                            
74 The position of the Department of Labor (which administers ERISA) dates back to the famous “Avon Letter” in 
1988. See Letter from the Department of Labor to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board of Avon 
Products, reprinted in 15 Pens. & Bens. Rep. (BNA), 391 (Feb. 29, 1988) (the “Avon Letter”). This letter expressed 
the Labor Department’s view that fiduciaries had to exercise their voting powers and vote shares; it was later codified 
in an Interpretive Bulletin issued by the Department of Labor. See 29 C.F.R. §2509-94-2(3) (July 1, 2007). This 
bulletin expressed the view that:  
“Active monitoring and communication with corporate management is consistent 
with a fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA when the responsible fiduciary 
concludes that there is a reasonable chance that such activities… are likely to 
enhance the value of the plan’s involvement, after taking into account the costs 
involved.” (emphasis added). 
See generally Paul Rissman and Diana Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment Advisors, 
Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility, 49 Environmental Law Reporter 
10155, at 10168-69 (2019). This “reasonable chance” standard was later marginally massaged into a “reasonable 
expectation” standard, as later discussed. 
The SEC followed several years later and similarly endorsed the duty of a fiduciary or investment advisor to 
vote the shares held by a mutual fund or other investment company. See SEC Release No. 33-8188, 34-4703 (July 21, 
2003). To sum up, both agencies agree that fiduciaries must vote their shares and must do so with the objective of 
increasing the value of the fund to their beneficiaries. 
75 See Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration, Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1 (“Interpretive 
Bulleting Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statement of Investment Policy, Including Proxy 
Voting Policies or Guidelines”) (12/29/2016). This revised bulletin adopted a “reasonable expectation” standard for 
when fiduciaries should engage in shareholder activism, with the expectation being that the plan’s assets would be 
enhanced.  
76 In its most recent statement, the Department of Labor under President Trump has continued to use a “reasonable 
expectation” standard and to recognize that voting has lower cost than investment decisions, but it has cautioned that 
the objective of shareholder activism must be the enhancement of the plan’s value (meaning that the fiduciary may 
not be pursuing political or social preferences). See Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01 (April 23, 2018). 
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earlier controls on carbon emissions, but five of which will benefit from that same 
resolution. Assume next that the fiduciaries take no action to sell any stock (after all, 
index funds rarely sell), but they decide to vote for this same resolution at all the 
affected companies, believing that the gains to the five will outweigh the losses to the 
one. Such a decision is intended to maximize the financial benefits to their 
beneficiaries and should not offend the “sole interest rule.” Equally important, this 
decision is entirely different from the traditional problem in the 1980s of whether 
fiduciaries could divest stocks of companies that continued to do business in South 
Africa. Divestment does imply a loss of diversification benefits to their beneficiaries. 
In the case of our hypothetical shareholder resolution, however, no threat is made by 
the fiduciaries to divest, but only to propose a slate of “friendlier” directors -- a voting 
decision. Although the Trump Administration has marginally cut back on the 
Department of Labor’s prior endorsement of shareholder activism under ERISA, it 
still has left in place a test that requires the fiduciary to have only a “reasonable 
expectation” that shareholder activism will produce benefits.77 
E. THE COMING CONTROVERSY OVER PORTFOLIO-WIDE DECISION MAKING. The 
vision that portfolio-wide voting by institutional investors could reduce externalities 
has excited scholars.78 But it will likely arouse controversy as well. Consider this 
                                                            
77 Compare Interpretive Bulletin No. 2016-1, supra note 75, (which was adopted by the Obama Administration in 
2016), with Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, supra note 76 (which was adopted under President Trump). See 
also Rissman and Kearney, supra note 74. 
78 This idea that common ownership will lead rational investors in a common portfolio to seek to minimize externalities 
probably originates with Robert Hansen and John M. Lott, Jr.. See Robert Hansen and John M. Lott, Jr., Externalities 
and Corporate Governance in a World With Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 
43, 47-49 (1996); see also Robert H. Gordon, Do Publicly-Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3303 (1990). But these authors wrote before the actual appearance 
of large scale common ownership. Recent interest in this topic may have been provoked by Madison Condon; see 
Condon, supra note 7. 
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hypothetical: five diversified index funds threaten a proxy contest to replace at least 
some of the directors of Smoky Coal Corp., unless it agrees to comply with certain 
environmental restrictions. Fearing a proxy contest, Smoky Coal management 
induces its board to agree to the restrictions and to appoint a partial slate of directors 
nominated by the index funds.  On the announcement of this decision, Smoky Coal’s 
stock price falls 10%, and Smoky Coal’s management closes its principal mine in 
Kentucky, with resulting large lay-offs of miners. Employees are outraged, as is a 
Senator from Kentucky who announces a senatorial committee hearing on the 
“arrogance” of the index funds.  
Meanwhile, the state legislature in Kentucky begins to draft legislation that 
would cancel the environmental changes just adopted, and corporate law firms 
develop a new form of poison pill that would bar the acquisition of more than 10% of 
a Kentucky company’s stock by any group of mutual funds that is seeking (or later 
seeks) to pass or support specified shareholder resolutions.  
The point here is not that this counter-reaction will succeed, but that counter-
pressure is predictable. Although I suspect that the threat of such political retaliation 
will incline many institutional investors toward no more than reticent participation 
in attempts to curb externalities through collective action, it is still premature at 
present to predict more than that controversy will surround collective action by 
institutional investors.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Briefly and bluntly, this article has offered four basic conclusions:  
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(1) Institutional investors logically have a greater interest in “systematic 
risk” than do undiversified investors (in part because only diversified 
investors with high common ownership can take effective action), and much 
of what ESG disclosures would provide relates to “systematic risk”; 
(2) Individual investors (at least if undiversified) have a greater interest in 
firm-specific “unsystematic risk” than do institutional investors, and they 
are not today adequately advised about the conflicts that arise between 
their interests and those of diversified institutional investors; 
(3) Because of the high level of common ownership among diversified 
institutional investors, they can potentially profit on a portfolio-wide basis 
by imposing constraints that seek to reduce externalities -- at least so long 
as such actions benefit the “winners” in their portfolio more than they 
impose costs on the “losers.” As common ownership grows, these practices 
may become more open and explicit, but they are already discernable. Once 
again, this aggravates the conflict between diversified and retail investors. 
(4) ESG disclosures and high common ownership enable diversified 
institutions to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis. The advent of 
portfolio-wide decision-making (both as to investments and voting) may 
represent the most important contemporary change in institutional 
investor behavior; it appears to be logically consistent with the “sole 
interest rule”, but it will provoke controversy. 
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This article has not asserted that fiduciaries must favor ESG investing. 
Decisions either to engage or not to engage in ESG investing should be protected, 
and, particularly to the extent that ESG information is normally forward-looking, the 
issuer should face little risk of liability either under the “sole interest rule” or the 
federal securities laws. The real issue for the future is whether institutional investors 
are truly ready to exercise this new opportunity (as it may provoke significant 
political pushback79).  
Not since Berle and Means announced the separation of ownership and control 
have shareholders as a group perceived themselves to possess the power to behave as 
“true owners.” But, unlike the “true owners” of the 19th Century (for example, the 
railroad, oil and bank barons), the focus of institutional investors as owners will 
logically shift to maximizing portfolio value, not the value of individual stocks. The 
implication of this transition is that it may solve a problem that has frustrated legal 
scholars for decades. Over that period, many scholars have sought to find a strategy 
to make public corporations behave more virtuously.80 Their gallant efforts have not 
fully persuaded most of us, and more conservative scholars have responded that 
reducing the externalities associated with corporate behavior was not the job of 
                                                            
79 In 2020, possibly in response to their activism in assisting institutional investors, proxy advisors were subjected to 
new and burdensome SEC rules that will slow the process by which they can advise and assist their clients. See 
Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War on Proxy Advisors, 16 NYU J. L. & Bus. 579 (2020). My point here is only that 
this example may concern and caution institutional investors, who must realize that activism can produce political 
retaliation in their cases as well. Nonetheless, the major institutional investors have much greater financial resources 
and seem less likely to attract political attacks. 
80 For a partial list, see Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999); Kent Greenfield, THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE LAW: 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006); Lynn Stout, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH (2012); Einer Elhange, Sacrificing Corporate Profit to Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005); 
William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachtler, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158, U. Pa. L. Rev. 653 
(2010). This list is far from exhaustive but includes articles that I considered highly original. 
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corporate law.81 Now, without any change in corporate law, a real possibility has 
arisen that corporate reform (at least in the reduction of externalities) is coming. 
Corporate law scholars now (at last) live in interesting times!  
                                                            
81 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L. J. 439 (2001) 
(shareholder wealth maximization is the goal of corporate law); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. App. Corp. Fin. 8, 16 (2000) (arguing that the regulation of 
externalities falls within the government’s function and is not a task that boards should pursue). 
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